Pennsylvania\u27s Capital Statute: Does the Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence - Into the Evaluation of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances - At the Sentencing Hearing of a Murder Trial Introduce Unjust Prejudice into the Imposition of the Death Penalty? by Nard, Jason Elliot
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 42 Number 4 Article 7 
2004 
Pennsylvania's Capital Statute: Does the Introduction of Victim 
Impact Evidence - Into the Evaluation of Mitigating and 
Aggravating Circumstances - At the Sentencing Hearing of a 
Murder Trial Introduce Unjust Prejudice into the Imposition of the 
Death Penalty? 
Jason Elliot Nard 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jason E. Nard, Pennsylvania's Capital Statute: Does the Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence - Into the 
Evaluation of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances - At the Sentencing Hearing of a Murder Trial 
Introduce Unjust Prejudice into the Imposition of the Death Penalty?, 42 Duq. L. Rev. 825 (2004). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol42/iss4/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Pennsylvania's Capital Statute: Does the
Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence-Into the
Evaluation of Mitigating and Aggravating
Circumstances-At the Sentencing Hearing of a
Murder Trial Introduce Unjust Prejudice into the
Imposition of the Death Penalty?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, inter alia, "nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'
Perhaps no other topic of law more directly embodies the very es-
sence of our legal system than the determination of whether to
impose the death penalty in the sentencing phase of a murder
conviction. There is no liberty greater than life itself; no liberty is
more personal and precious than the right to live. Yet this fun-
damental right is arguably infringed upon by the use of victim
impact evidence by prosecutors during the sentencing phase of a
first-degree murder conviction, pursuant to statutory sentencing
guidelines.
When one is convicted of first-degree murder at trial in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, a second trial, the sentencing
phase, is then held to determine if the individual will serve life
imprisonment or have the death penalty imposed.! This is statu-
torily provided for through the sentencing code for capital crimes.3
The statute provides that the Commonwealth must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt at least one of eighteen enumerated aggravat-
ing circumstances4 and then allows the defendant to introduce
1. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
2. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (2003). In Pennsylvania, aggravated first degree
murder is the only crime to which the sentence of death is applicable. Id. at (a)(1).
3. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711. See also LESTER G. NAUHOUS & BRUCE LEDEWITZ,
PRELIMINARY PENNSYLVANIA DEATH PENALTY MANUAL 8 (Allegheny County Office of Public
Defender & Allegheny County Death Penalty Project, 1985).
4. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iii), which provides "aggravating circum-
stances must be proved by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt; mitigating cir-
cumstances must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. See
also id. at § 9711(d), which limits the aggravating circumstances to the following:
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(1) The victim was a firefighter, peace officer, public servant concerned in official de-
tention, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 5121 (relating to escape), judge of any court in the
unified judicial system, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, a deputy attorney
general, district attorney, assistant district attorney, member of the General Assem-
bly, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Auditor General, State Treasurer, State law en-
forcement official, local law enforcement official, Federal law enforcement official or
person employed to assist or assisting any law enforcement official in the perform-
ance of his duties, who was killed in the performance of his duties or as a result of his
official position.
(2) The defendant paid or was paid by another person or had contracted to pay or be
paid by another person or had conspired to pay or be paid by another person for the
killing of the victim.
(3) The victim was being held by the defendant for ransom or reward, or as a shield
or hostage.
(4) The death of the victim occurred while defendant was engaged in the hijacking of
an aircraft.
(5) The victim was a prosecution witness to a murder or other felony committed by
the defendant and was killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony against the
defendant in any grand jury or criminal proceeding involving such offenses.
(6) The defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony.
(7) In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of
death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense.
(8) The offense was committed by means of torture.
(9) The defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or
threat of violence to the person.
(10) The defendant has been convicted of another Federal or State offense, committed
either before or at the time of the offense at issue, for which a sentence of life impris-
onment or death was imposable or the defendant was undergoing a sentence of life
imprisonment for any reason at the time of the commission of the offense.
(11) The defendant has been convicted of another murder committed in any jurisdic-
tion and committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue.
(12) The defendant has been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, as defined in 18
Pa.C.S. § 2503 (relating to voluntary manslaughter), or a substantially equivalent
crime in any other jurisdiction, committed either before or at the time of the offense
at issue.
(13) The defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice in the killing, as de-
fined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c) (relating to liability for conduct of another; complicity),
while in the perpetration of a felony under the provisions of the act of April 14, 1972
(P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic
Act, and punishable under the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508 (relating to drug traf-
ficking sentencing and penalties).
(14) At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been involved, associated or in
competition with the defendant in the sale, manufacture, distribution or delivery of
any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance in violation of The Con-
trolled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act or similar law of any other state,
the District of Columbia or the United States, and the defendant committed the kill-
ing or was an accomplice to the killing as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c), and the kill-
ing resulted from or was related to that association, involvement or competition to
promote the defendant's activities in selling, manufacturing, distributing or deliver-
ing controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances.
(15) At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been a nongovernmental infor-
mant or had otherwise provided any investigative, law enforcement or police agency
with information concerning criminal activity and the defendant committed the kill-
ing or was an accomplice to the killing as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c), and the kill-
ing was in retaliation for the victim's activities as a nongovernmental informant or in
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evidence of mitigating circumstances.5 If at least one aggravating
circumstance is found by a unanimous jury, and no mitigating cir-
cumstances are present, the imposition of death is mandatory.6 If
mitigating circumstances exist, as found by any juror, the jury
must unanimously determine whether the aggravating circum-
stances outweigh the mitigating ones to impose death; if it is
found that the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the
mitigating circumstances or if a unanimous determination is not
made, the jury must instead impose life imprisonment.! It is this
author's position that this is where victim impact evidence is un-
fairly utilized because the Pennsylvania statute provides for its
use in weighing the circumstances.
Victim impact evidence is a form of evidence that describes the
effect of the crime on the victim and, more specifically, on the vic-
tim's family.' The Pennsylvania Statute itself actually provides
providing information concerning criminal activity to an investigative, law enforce-
ment or police agency.
(16) The victim was a child under 12 years of age.
(17) At the time of the killing, the victim was in her third trimester of pregnancy or
the defendant had knowledge of the victim's pregnancy.
(18) At the time of the killing the defendant was subject to a court order restricting in
any way the defendant's behavior toward the victim pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. Ch. 61
(relating to protection from abuse) or any other order of a court of common pleas or
of the minor judiciary designed in whole or in part to protect the victim from the de-
fendant.
Id.
5. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e), which provides mitigating circumstances
will include:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convictions.
(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance.
(3) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(4) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress, although not such duress as to consti-
tute a defense under 18 Pa.C.S. § 309 (relating to duress), or acted under the sub-
stantial domination of another person.
(6) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to
the homicidal acts.
(7) The defendant's participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(8) Any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the de-
fendant and the circumstances of his offense.
Id.
6. Id. at § 9711(c)(iv).
7. Id.
8. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 498-99 (1987). The victim impact statement is
drafted by the State Division of Parole and Probation, with information supplied by the
victim or the victim's family, and may be read to the jury during the sentencing phase. The
family members may also be called to testify to the information in front of the jury at the
sentencing hearing. Id. at 499.
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for the use of this evidence, yet fails to provide sufficient guide-
lines on how the jury is to use such evidence.9 Herein lies the es-
sence of one part of the unconstitutional nature of the use of vic-
tim impact evidence: the statute itself is structured so as to elicit
the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death, because capital
jurors often are not fully aware of how to consider victim impact
evidence and because a verdict is to be reached only after making
an "individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death
penalty," not merely by counting the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. ° Similar to those of other states, Pennsylvania's
statute improperly leads jurors to believe they merely have to
count and compare aggravating and mitigating circumstances to
reach a decision without any thought of whether the verdict is a
"reasoned moral response" to the crime."
The second part of the unconstitutionality of victim impact evi-
dence is that, by the very nature of the evidence, an arbitrary fac-
tor is injected into the sentencing phase.2 Such testimonial evi-
dence emphasizes the victim's outstanding qualities and describes
the severe emotional and personal problems inflicted on the family
members of the victim in a manner that can be described only as
inflammatory; 3 something that in any other situation is imper-
missible by the Rules of Evidence. 4 Victim impact evidence by its
9. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(2) provides:
In the sentencing hearing, evidence concerning the victim and the impact that the
death of the victim has had on the family of the victim is admissible. Additionally,
evidence may be presented as to any other matter that the court deems relevant and
admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed. Evidence shall include
matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances specified in
subsections (d) and (e), and information concerning the victim and the impact that
the death of the victim has had on the family of the victim. Evidence of aggravating
circumstances shall be limited to those circumstances specified in subsection (d).
Id.
10. Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy Of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 26, 38 (2000) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989)).
11. See Garvey, supra note 10, at 38 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
12. Louis F. D'Onofrio, Note, A Deadly Constitutional Mistake: The General Admissibil-
ity Of Victim Impact Evidence Under Pennsylvania's Death Penalty Statute-
Commonwealth v. Means, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 169, 170 (2002). See also Com-
monwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143, 161 (Pa. 2001).
13. D'Onofrio, supra note 12, at 170 (asserting that "some victim impact evidence will
necessarily carry more influence depending on who the victim was, who the members of the
victim's family are, the ability of the jury to relate to the victim and the victim's family, and
the ability of the victim's family to articulate their grief to the jury."). See also Booth, 482
U.S. at 504-06.
14. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (2003); PA. R. EVID. 403 (2003).
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very nature is guaranteed to tug on the proverbial heart strings of
the jury, thereby resulting in an unavoidably tainted decision. 5
In recent times, the United States Supreme Court shifted the
legal tides and made a stark change in the prevailing precedent by
holding that a defendant's culpability depends, in part, on the de-
tails of the victim's life and the impact that the death had on his
or her family.1" The logic of this premise, specifically that a defen-
dant's culpability actually depends on factors that most likely
were not considered or even known at the time the crime was
committed or known to the jury when making a determination of
guilt or innocence, is rather demented. Further, and perhaps even
more disturbing, is that such reasoning makes it somehow less
morally reprehensible to murder someone who does not have fam-
ily or who's family was less distraught over the murder. The uni-
maginable act of maliciously murdering someone without cause,
and not the personal characteristics of the victim, should be what
our society's most serious of retributions should be premised upon.
After all, this country was founded upon the ideal that its citizens
should receive equal treatment and protection of the law.
The use of victim impact evidence in sentencing introduces re-
taliation, pity, passion and personal vengeance into the proceed-
ing's deliberative process." Accordingly, such evidence is ex-
tremely emotional as well as virtually unimpeachable and irrefu-
table. 8 Victim impact evidence, and the Commonwealth's stat-
ute,19 promote punishment premised upon fortuitous, arbitrary,
and inflammatory considerations." As such, its use in the sentenc-
ing phase of a first-degree murder case violates the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
15. Both FED. R. EViD. 403 (2003) and PA. R. EVID. 403 (2003) mandate the exclusion of
such evidence during the actual trial if the probabtive value is outweighed, inter alia, by
the danger of unfair prejudice.
16. See Garvey, supra note 10, at 48 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825
(1991)).
17. Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform Or Reprisal?, 27 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 391, 398 (1989).
18. Hellerstein, supra note 17, at 398.
19. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (2003).
20. Sandvik v. State, 564 P.2d 20, 28 (Alaska 1977) (Boochover, C.J., dissenting).
"There is a world of difference between presenting the basic facts necessary for the judge to
be informed adequately of the circumstances surrounding the offense and including an
emotion-laden narrative pertaining to the victim." Id. at 28 (Boochover, C.J., dissenting).
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II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Although victim impact evidence and jury sentencing guide-
lines, as a whole, are relatively new facets of capital sentencing
statutes, capital laws are deeply entrenched in humanity's history
as evidenced by their codification as early as the Eighteenth Cen-
tury B.C. in the Code of King Hammaurabi.' Ancient societies
subsequently enacted such laws as the Seventh Century B.C.'s
Draconian Code of Athens and the Fifth Century B.C. Roman law
of the Twelve Tablets, thereby developing their own variations of
the death penalty."
Britain began enforcing the death penalty by throwing crimi-
nals into a quagmire at around 438 B.C.23 Eventually, hanging
criminals from the gallows was the method of execution instituted
by Britain during the Tenth Century A.D.2" The capital laws of
Britain became the most influential on American law because the
colonists brought the use of capital punishment from their experi-
ences in England.2" The laws began to undergo reform in the
1700's due to evolving standards that viewed death as a punish-
ment too severe for crimes other than treason and murder.26 In
1794, Dr. Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independ-
ence and U.S. Attorney, led Pennsylvania to become the first state
to repeal the death penalty for all offenses except a first-degree
murder conviction, which required death without exception. 7 In
1838, some states began passing laws against the mandatory sen-
tence of death by codifying discretionary statutes that became the
basis of modern death penalty statutes.2' By 1963, mandatory
capital punishment laws were removed from the penal codes of
every state in the country.29 In 1959, the American Law Institute
21. LAURA E. RANDA, SOCIETY'S FINAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF THE
DEATH PENALTY 1 (1997). The Code of King Hammaurabi provided death for 25 separate
crimes, although murder was not one of them. Id. at 1.
22. RANDA, supra note 21, at 1.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 4.
27. RANDA, supra note 21, at 5.
28. ROBERT E. BOHM, DEATHQUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (Anderson Publishing, 1999). "In 1838,
Tennessee became the first state to enact a discretionary death penalty statute for murder;
Alabama did the same, three years later. Between the Civil War and the end of the nine-
teenth century, at least 20 additional jurisdictions changed their death penalty laws from
mandatory to discretionary ones." Id.
29. BOHM, supra note 28, at 5.
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recommended that jury sentencing discretion should be controlled
by some uniform standards, but the institute did not receive much
support for this ideal until recently.
III. MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF DEATH PENALTY STATUTES
In Trop v. Dulles,"' the Eighth Amendment was interpreted as
containing an "evolving standard of decency that marked the pro-
gress of a maturing society."32 This evolving standard became the
basis of argument for opponents of capital punishment in the
1960's.33 Although Trop was not a death penalty case, opponents
used the evolving standard interpretation to argue that the death
penalty was no longer appropriate in our country because it con-
stituted "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth
Amendment.' Despite the fact that these constitutional attacks
were rejected, this marked the beginning of the "fine tuning" of
the death penalty with the development of both jury and prosecu-
tor discretion in the imposition of death.35
In the 1968 case of U.S. v. Jackson,36 the Supreme Court re-
viewed a provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act 7 that required a
recommendation by the jury for the death penalty to be imposed.38
The sentence of death could only be imposed with a recommenda-
tion by the jury so defendants were essentially coerced into waiv-
ing their constitutional right to a jury trial to avoid the death pen-
alty, which the Court held as unconstitutional.
In 1971, jury discretion was examined directly in the consoli-
dated case of McGautha v. California." The common claim be-
30. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 202-03 (1971); See also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 201.6 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959).
31. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
32. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
33. Id.
34. BOHM, supra note 28, at 10-11. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
35. Id.
36. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
37. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1201.
38. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 572.
39. Id. at 571-72. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[iun all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury..." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
40. 402 U.S. 183, 186 (1971). The case involved a consolidation of Crampton v. Ohio,
248 N.E.2d 614 (Ohio 1969) and McGautha v. California, 452 P.2d 650 (Cal. 1969). Both
defendants were convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death pursuant to jury
discretion, with the procedural difference of Crampton having both the conviction and sen-
tencing in one trial, while McGautha received a bifurcated trial. Id. at 185. A bifurcated
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tween the two cases was that the jury had unrestricted discretion,
resulting in arbitrary and capricious sentencing, which was di-
rectly violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process guar-
antee.4' The Court said that jury discretion was developed as a
means of dispensing mercy in capital cases, and that instructions
have the effect of interfering with this scheme instead of further-
ing it. 42 Extenuating circumstances such as intoxication were held
to be committed to jury discretion alone.43 The Court stated that
the sentencing authority's ability to draft means of channeling
sentencing discretion that could be easily understood and applied
are beyond present human ability and any attempt to do so would
actually result in a restriction of what may be considered." Thus,
the Court found that giving the jury complete discretion provided
the largest scope of consideration in allowing a jury to be merciful
and did not offend any part of the Constitution.45
In McGautha, it was also argued that the Constitution requires
a bifurcated trial as part of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause so that evidence relevant to punishment would not
prejudice the defendant's case on guilt.46 The contention was that
Due Process required the removal of the conflict between the con-
stitutional right to be heard during trial and the right not to have
one's sentence fixed before all relevant evidence is heard." The
use of a bifurcated trial eliminates this imperfection by its design
because the guilt is fully adjudicated before any punishment
phase is commenced. s
The Court first stated that the criminal process is replete with
situations where making a difficult decision is required and that,
although one may have a constitutional right, the Constitution
trial is [a] trial that is divided into two stages, such as for guilt and punishment.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1222 (7th ed. 2000).
41. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 196. Both defendants argued the common claim that the
absence of standards to be used as guidelines in the jury's discretion on deciding the pun-
ishment caused capricious sentencing that is "fundamentally lawless" and thus violative of
the notion of no state depriving a person of life without due process of law as guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
42. Id. at 200 (citing Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 313 (1899)).
43. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 200-01.
44. Id. at 204.
45. Id. at 207-08.
46. Id. at 209-10 (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967)). The contention was
that, under Ohio law, one could exercise the Constitutional right not to incriminate oneself
only at the cost of surrendering the ability to plead on the issue of punishment in a one
trial adjudication. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 209-10.




does not usually forbid a procedure that creates said choice. 49 No
support was found in the history, policies, or precedents relating
to the privilege provided by the Fifth Amendment, 50 to necessitate
that a state provide a means whereby one wishing to proffer evi-
dence on the issue of punishments can do so without worrying that
he or she will ultimately be devastating his or her case.5" Conse-
quently, the Court held that although bifurcated trials may be a
superior means of dealing with capital cases, as suggested by both
the American Law Institute and the National Commission on Re-
form for Federal Criminal Laws, the Federal Constitution does not
require trial procedures that are models of perfection.52 The Con-
stitution merely requires that trials are conducted fairly, while
guaranteeing that a defendant's rights are scrupulously re-
spected.53
Due Process requires that a defendant be given the full benefits
of our judicial system so as to vigilantly protect his or her funda-
mental rights. When the jury is completely at liberty to impose a
death sentence as it sees fit, the law is essentially discarded. As
such, the most precious fundamental right to life is deprived with-
out due process.
The decision in McGautha offends Due Process in two ways.
First, the holding that unrestricted jury discretion furthers the
dispensing of mercy is completely devoid of any reasonable foun-
dation. Despite the presumption that jurors are competent to
comprehend the law, they are not jurists and do not possess a
jurists's ability to approach legal analysis without bias. Without
proper instruction, jurors will base their legal interpretations and
decisions on their experiences or personal beliefs. By not limiting
jury discretion in capital sentencing, to prevent diversion of focus
to improper considerations, arbitrary and capricious determina-
tions will inevitably result.
Second, by not requiring bifurcated trials, a capital defendant is
unduly prejudiced in the determination of his or her guilt. Such
court sanctioned prejudice emanates from the conflict of constitu-
tional rights, which the McGautha Court insisted were not an is-
49. Id. at 213 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769 (1970)).
50. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 213-14 (referencing the Federal Consitution's Fifth
Amendment right not to be forced to testify so that evidence may be used against the de-
fendant/witness).
51. Id. at 214.
52. Id. at 221 (referencing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967)).
53. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 221.
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sue, between the Fifth Amendment right not to testify and the
right to present evidence to defend oneself at sentencing under the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of Due Process. In the ab-
sence of bifurcated trials in capital cases, a defendant's constitu-
tional rights are not protected and it is impossible to have a fair
trial.
In 1972, the proverbial tides began to shift in the consolidated
landmark case of Furman v. Georgia.' Furman contended that
unrestricted juror discretion resulted in arbitrary sentencing and
brought his challenges under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, arguing that a punishment is "cruel and unusual" if it was,
inter alia, arbitrary.55 The Court held that the Georgia statute,
providing complete jury discretion, could result in arbitrary sen-
tencing and was therefore "cruel and unusual" punishment, which
violated the Eighth Amendment.56 This decision effectively voided
all state death penalty statutes, thirty-five separate state statutes
in all, which did not provide guidelines for jury discretion in decid-
ing whether to impose a sentence of death.
The Supreme Court holding in Furman effectively suspended
the sentence of death in all cases, which resulted in a majority of
the states ambitiously rewriting their statutes to limit discretion
in an attempt to comport with the Supreme Court decision.58
Some states tried to accomplish this with a complete removal of
discretion by mandating a sentence of death for certain heinous
crimes, but such statutory efforts were quickly held unconstitu-
tional.59 Other states sought to limit the discretion through the
codification of sentencing guidelines that allowed for the introduc-
tion of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining
the punishment to be imposed."
54. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The case involved a consolidation of Furman v. Georgia, 167
S.E.2d 628 (Ga. 1969), Jackson v. Georgia, 171 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1969) and Branch v. Texas,
447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1969).
55. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. The Court set the standard that a punishment would
be "cruel and unusual" if it was too severe for the crime, if it was arbitrary, if it offended
society's sense of justice, or if it was not more effective than a less severe penalty. Id.
56. Id.
57. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (explaining the effect of the Furman
decision).
58. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80.
59. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that the practice of deal-
ing with unguided jury discretion by removing all discretion through mandating capital
punishment for those convicted of capital crimes unconstitutional).
60. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280.
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Such discretionary statutes were first approved by the Supreme
Court in three cases collectively referred to as the Gregg decision
in 1976.61 The landmark case was important in the following fac-
ets: the decision reinstated death penalty statutes that used ag-
gravating and mitigating sentencing guidelines;" held that the
death penalty itself was constitutional under the Eighth Amend-
ment;63 mandated the requirement of bifurcated trials with sepa-
rate deliberations for guilt and penalty phases;6' imposed the re-
quirement of automatic appellate review of capital cases;65 and
required proportionality review.66
In Gregg, the Court first analyzed whether the death sentence
was "cruel and unusual" punishment in violation of both the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.6 ' The Court first stated that
the term "cruel and unusual" punishment was adopted by the
framers who were primarily concerned with preventing "tortures"
and "barbarous" treatment, not capital punishment as a whole.6"
The early challenges under this theory support this rationale be-
cause they questioned the method of the execution and not the
imposition of death itself.69 However, the prohibition of the Eighth
61. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976).
62. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-95, 202-03.
63. Id. at 187.
64. Id. at 190-91.
65. Id. at 198, 204.
66. Id. at 198, 206. Proportionality review is defined as: "An appellate court's analysis
of whether a death sentence is arbitrary or capricious by comparing the case in which it
was imposed with similar cases in which the death penalty was approved or disapproved."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 989 (7th ed. 2000).
67. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162.
68. Id. at 169 (citing Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments In-
flicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 852-853 (1969)). The tenth declara-
tory clause of a bill ratified by Monarchs William and Mary read: "That excessive bail ought
not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169. This language was adopted verbatim into the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776 and, with the substitution of "shall" for "ought," now appears
in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Granucci, 57 CALIF. L. REV.
at 853. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
69. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170. The Court in Gregg stated:
In the earliest cases raising Eighth Amendment claims, the court focused on particu-
lar methods of execution to determine whether they were too cruel to pass constitu-
tional muster. The constitutionality of the sentence of death itself was not at issue,
and the criterion used to evaluate the mode of execution was its similarity to "tor-
ture" and other "barbarous" methods.
Id. See also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879), where the Court stated:
Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitu-
tional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be in-
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Amendment has been interpreted in a dynamic manner, and
evolves as "public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane jus-
tice." ° Therefore, modern values concerning the imposition of a
challenged sanction must be assessed when analyzing the applica-
tion of the Eighth Amendment. 1 Under the Eighth Amendment,
the punishment must not be excessive for the crime, which is de-
termined by two aspects: 1) that the punishment does not involve
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain; and 2) the punishment
must not be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.72
However, the assessment of modern values must also recognize
that, at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, capital pun-
ishment was common in every state and it is apparent from the
language of the Constitution that the framers accepted it.73 Addi-
tionally, the Court posited the fact that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, though adopted more than seventy-five years later, simi-
larly considered and accepted the existence of the sanction. 4
Accordingly, the Court found the "excessiveness" prong of the
aforementioned test was not met because of society's endorsement
of capital punishment, as evidenced by at least thirty-five states
that immediately drafted statutes with discretionary sentencing
guidelines shortly after the decision in Furman." Further proof
was found in the fact that juries continued to impose death sen-
tences, despite the ability to instead impose life imprisonment. 6
flicted; It is safe to affirm that punishments of torture... and all others in the same
line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution."
Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136-37.
70. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 378
(1910)).
71. Id. at 173 (noting that although public policy is a concern, it is not conclusive in
itself).
72. Id. See also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100-01 (1958).
73. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177.
The Fifth Amendment ... contemplated the continued existence of the capital sanc-
tion by imposing certain limits on the prosecution of capital cases: 'No person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury. .. ; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; ... not be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law... '
Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 180. Statutes were enacted that attempted to comply with the opinion of
Furman by: "(i) specifying the factors to be weighed and the procedures to be followed in
deciding when to impose a capital punishment, or (ii) making death mandatory for specified
crimes." Id. at 179-80.
76. Id. at 182. The penalty serves two purposes: (1) retribution-the instinct for this is
part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal
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The Court found that the second prong was not met either because
a sentence of death cannot be said to be disproportionate to the
crime of intentional and unjustified murder.7  Therefore, the
Court held that the death penalty as a whole could not be held to
always be constitutionally impermissible.5
The Court then examined the validity of death penalty statutes,
in light of Furman, that provided jury guidelines through the use
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 9 Furman required
that when a sentencing body is given discretion to impose death,
such discretion must be appropriately directed and limited in or-
der to avoid the risk of arbitrary and capricious sentences. s How-
ever, the Court asserted that our judicial system has long recog-
nized that justice requires the circumstances of the crime be con-
sidered, along with the character and propensities of the actor, for
the determination of sentences in order for our legal system to op-
erate in a consistent and sensible manner."1 The solutions to this
problem were deemed to be the use of bifurcated trials and the use
of jury guidelines through aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. s2
justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law,
and (2) deterrence-though many studies have provided conflicting results on whether the
threat of death actually deters such violence, there is no empirical evidence proving or
disproving and thus, the court cannot say such punishment does not deter and thus is not
unconstitutional. Id. at 183-86.
77. Id. at 187. Although there is no doubt that capital punishment is unique in its
severity and irrevocability, the court could not hold that it is invariably disproportionate to
the crime of deliberately taking another's life ... it is an extreme sanction, suitable to the
most extreme crimes. Id.
78. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187.
79. Id. at 189.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937)). See also
Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585 (1959); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247
(1949). Jury sentencing is desirable in capital cases to maintain a link between contempo-
rary values and the penal system; a link without which the determination of punishment
could not reflect the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of punishment
of a maturing society." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189. But this creates problems such as informa-
tion relevant to the penalty phase being worthless during the guilt determination and more
importantly that it may be prejudicial to a fair adjudication for the accused. Gregg, 428
U.S. at 190-92.
82. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191. The Gregg Court indicated that this was recommended by
the drafters of the Model Penal Code as follows:
[If a unitarian proceeding is used] the determination of the punishment must be
based on less than all the evidence that has a bearing on that issue, such for example
as a previous criminal record ... though it would be excluded as irrelevant or preju-
dicial with respect to guilt or innocence alone ... The obvious solution ... is to bifur-
cate the proceeding ... but once guilt has been determined opening the record to the
further information that is relevant to sentence.
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The Court discussed the fact that although other courts83 have
asserted that standards to guide jury discretion in capital case
deliberations are impossible to formulate, these standards had
already been developed by the drafters of the Model Penal Code."
The drafters stated it was indeed possible to point to the main cir-
cumstances of aggravation and mitigation.85 These circumstances
should be weighed individually and then against each other when
both are present in a given case.86 Although such standards are
somewhat general, they do reduce the possibility of a sentence be-
ing imposed in a capricious or arbitrary manner by providing
guidance to the jury. These standards support constitutionality
because the requirement of automatic appellate review safeguards
from an improper sentence. 7 The Court stated that statutes that
incorporate guidelines, such as were suggested by the Model Penal
Code, in conjunction with the safeguards of a bifurcated trial,
automatic appellate review, and the procedure of comparing with
similar cases to evaluate proportionality, proved that constructing
a capital sentencing system that complied with the constitutional
concerns in Furman was possible.8
With the decision in Gregg, the validity of the Model Penal
Code's aggravating and mitigating circumstances was solidified
because it became the model for what is used across the nation in
determining a sentence of death. However, the premise of victim
impact evidence as an aggravating circumstance had not then
been evaluated under constitutional guidelines.89 The personal-
Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, cmt. 5 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)).
But the provision of relevant information under fair procedural rules is not alone suf-
ficient to guarantee that the information will be properly used in the imposition of
punishment . .. Since the members of the jury will have had little, if any, previous
experience in sentencing, they are unlikely to be skilled in dealing with the informa-
tion . . . It seems clear, however, that the problem will be alleviated if the jury is
given guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant.
Id. at 192 (internal citations omitted).
83. See, e.g., McGautha, 402 U.S. at 183.
84. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193.
85. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, cmt. 3 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)).
86. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, cmt. 3 (Tentative Draft
No. 9, 1959)).
87. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 194-95.
88. Id. at 195. The Court in Furman held that death sentences imposed under statues
that gave juries unrestricted discretion to impose or withhold the death penalty violated
both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 195 n.47.
89. Niru Shanker, Getting a Grip on Payne and Restricting the Influence of Victim
Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing: The Timothy McVeigh Case and Various State
Approaches Compared, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 711 (Spring 1999). Victim impact testi-
mony allows family, friends, and members of the community to testify at capital sentencing
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ized nature of victim impact evidence, and the emotions that are
inherent in it, introduces what is often argued to be an impermis-
sible element of arbitrariness into death penalty deliberation.90
Whether such arbitrary evidence could be utilized during the sen-
tencing phase was an issue that had escaped review by the Su-
preme Court at the time of Gregg.
The Gregg decision finally gave validity to the assertion that
Due Process was violated in the absence of a bifurcated trial,
which had previously lacked historical support. This was a well
founded holding since having a guilt determination and sentenc-
ing determination in the same trial would allow the jury to hear
potentially prejudicial evidence upon which it could improperly
base the determination of guilt. In regard to the subject of jury
discretion, unrestricted jury discretion may cause jurors to impose
the death sentence based on improper considerations such as per-
sonal emotions. This is at the very core of the problem with victim
impact evidence. In Gregg, the Court held that the safeguards of a
bifurcated trial and jury guidelines are sufficient to eliminate any
prejudicial effect. However, while simple guidelines may be
enough to permit the use of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, victim impact evidence brings a whole new concern into
play. Victim impact evidence is so purely emotional and inflam-
matory that there are no words that can make it likely, let alone
ensure, that jurors will not improperly base the determination of
death upon such improper considerations.
IV. THE ADVENT OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
The origins of victim impact evidence date back to before the
development of the sentencing discretion guidelines, with which
they are now connected. The foundation for victim impact. evi-
dence was laid by the Victim's Rights Movement of the nineteen-
sixties, which sought to gain fairer treatment of rape victims dur-
ing judicial proceedings.9 After two decades of evolution and in-
creasing momentum, Congress enacted the Victim and Witness
about the impact the crime had upon them personally. This includes anything from the
impact upon individual family members to the overall impact of the victim's death on the
community as a whole and is used in determining whether to sentence the defendant to life
in prison or death. Id. at 711.




Protection Act of 1982,92 and the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984. 9" The first constitutional challenge to victim impact
evidence in capital sentencing quickly followed these Acts in the
Supreme Court case of Booth v. Maryland.94
In Booth, Maryland law mandated a pre-sentence report that
contained both information about the defendant and a victim im-
pact statement, which described the effect of the crime on the vic-
tim and the victim's family.95 Such statements often contain com-
ments emphasizing the victim's outstanding qualities and vividly
describing the severe emotional and personal problems caused to
the family members of the victim.96 Booth was sentenced to death
by the trial court, which was affirmed on automatic review by the
Maryland Court of Appeals.97
The Court evaluated the rule established in Gregg, which stated
that the discretion to impose death must be "suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capri-
cious action."98 The Booth Court held that the Constitution places
some limits on this discretion,99 and therefore, a statute requiring
consideration of factors other than those such as an actor's record
and circumstances of the crime, must be scrutinized to ensure the
evidence is relevant to establishing the actor's personal responsi-
bility and moral guilt.00 The majority of victim impact evidence
focuses on describing the emotional trauma suffered by the vic-
tim's family. The Court noted that states such as Maryland claim
that by knowing the extent of this impact, the jury is better able to
weigh the "gravity or aggravating quality" of the crime.' The
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982). This was an amendment to Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure requiring the inclusion of victim impact statements as part of a pre-sentence
report submitted to the sentencing authority. See Shanker, supra note 89, at 712.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1984). See Shanker, supra note 89, at 712.
94. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
95. Booth, 482 U.S. at 498-99. The victim impact statement is drafted by the State
Division of Parole and Probation with information supplied by the victim or the victim's
family, which may be read to the jury during the sentencing phase. Id. The family mem-
bers may also be called to testify to the information in front of the jury at the sentencing
hearing. Id. at 499.
96. Id. at 499-500.
97. Id. at 501.
98. Id. at 502 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189).
99. Id. at 502.
100. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)). "To do
otherwise would create the risk that a death sentence will be based on considerations that
are 'constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process.'" Id. at
502; see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983).
101. Booth, 482 U.S. at 503-04.
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Court said that the function of the jury is to "express the con-
science of the community" on the question of death and in doing so
is required to view the defendant as a uniquely individual human
being.1 12 However, victim impact evidence is focused on the effect
on the victim's family and not the defendant.'
A defendant usually has no knowledge about the existence or
characteristics of the victim's family, and in fact, victims are
rarely selected based on whether there would be an effect on any-
one other than the victim.' A decision premised on this evidence,
instead of on evidence relevant to the defendant and the crime,
diverts the jury's focus to irrelevant information independent of
the decision to kill.' 5 Introduction of victim impact evidence re-
sults in an impermissible risk of a capricious and arbitrary impo-
sition of the death penalty, and a family's grief is irrelevant to the
decision whether a defendant should be subject to the death pen-
alty because it is the crime at issue, not the resulting grief.' 6 The
Court ultimately held that victim impact evidence is unconstitu-
tional under the Eighth Amendment and that such evidence
served "no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it
from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the
crime and the defendant.',
07
The rationale underlying the holding of the Booth Court was
well reasoned. Factors other than the crime itself, the associated
conduct or the defendant's admissible record must be strictly scru-
tinized to ensure that only relevant evidence may be presented to
the jury. To be relevant, the evidence must go to culpability and
not to the unfortunate effects that were not part of the crime or its
scheme. Although the jury is said to require the impact of the
crime to best weigh the gravity of the crime itself, victim impact
102. Id. at 504 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)); see also
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
103. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504. "The focus of VIS, however, is not on the defendant, but on
the character and reputation of the victim and the effect on his family . . . These factors
may be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 504-05 (citing People v. Levitt, 156 Cal. App. 3d 500, 516-17 (1984)). A Cali-
fornia state court noted:
We think it obvious that a defendant's level of culpability depends not on fortuitous
circumstances such as the composition of his victim's family, but on circumstances
over which he has control .. . In contrast, the fact that a victim's family is irre-
deemably bereaved can be attributable to no act of will of the defendant.., but it has
no relationship to the proper purposes of sentencing in a criminal case.
Id. at 504-05 n.7.
106. Booth, 482 U.S at 505.
107. Id. at 508-09.
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evidence is more likely to elicit anger or pity than it is to provide a
basis upon which to determine the aggravating quality. The loss
to the family is inherent in the death of the victim and, even as-
suming arguendo that it was not, can be established by less in-
flammatory means. When this occurs, victim impact evidence is
more likely to result in juries returning verdicts based on their
outrage or pity instead of the relevant facts, which results in arbi-
trary and capricious sentences that violate constitutional rights.
In 1990, the Crime Control Act' was enacted by the United
States Congress to provide further victims' rights.09 In 1991, the
Supreme Court holding in Booth was reversed in Payne v. Tennes-
see 10 when the Court held that the use of victim impact evidence
at capital sentencing was constitutional.' In reaching this con-
clusion, the Payne Court revisited the two-fold analysis in the
Booth decision. The first part of this analysis held that evidence
of the harm the homicide causes a victim's family does not go to
the defendant's blameworthiness, and second, that only evidence
that relates to blameworthiness is pertinent to the sentencing
phase of capital cases."2 The Court stated that the harm inflicted
by a crime has a long history in our criminal law system in deter-
mining both the elements of the crime and the proper punishment,
and it stated that victim impact evidence is merely a tool to inform
the sentencing jury about the specific harm that was actually
caused by the murder at issue.13 Consequently, the Court stated
that two defendants with equal blameworthiness might be found
guilty of different crimes premised solely on the fact that their
respective conduct caused different degrees of harm."4 Hence, a
fundamental unfairness would result if mitigating evidence was
unrestricted while victim impact evidence was completely elimi-
nated as suggested in Booth."' For the foregoing reasons, the
108. 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1990).
109. See id.
110. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
111. Payne, 501 U.S. at 808.
112. Id. at 819. The Court concluded that while no prior decision has mandated that
only the defendant's character and immediate characteristics of the crime may be consid-
ered constitutionally, other factors are irrelevant to the capital sentencing unless they have
some bearing on the defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt. Id. See also
Booth, 482 U.S at 502.
113. Payne, 501 U.S. at 819.
114. Id. Thus, one could reason that understanding the degree of harm would be essen-
tial in determining the correct degree of punishment.
115. Id. at 825-26. "While virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evi-
dence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances, the State is
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Court thought the Booth Court's holding that victim impact evi-
dence was a conduit to the arbitrary imposition of death was
wrong. 16
However, the Payne Court recognized that there was some in-
herent risk with the use of victim impact evidence."7 Nonetheless,
the Court held that the inherent risk was sufficiently safeguarded
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."8 De-
spite the potential threat of prejudice, and because it believed that
sufficient safeguards existed, the Court said that the need for the
jury to have evidence of the specific harm in assessing the moral
culpability and blameworthiness made victim impact evidence just
and constitutionally valid."9 The majority asserted that the Booth
Court misinterpreted precedent, which produced a decision that
unfairly favored capital defendants. 2 ° As such, the Court held
that the Eighth Amendment did not create a per se ban if a state
permitted the use of victim impact evidence by the prosecution.
12'
This holding was based on the reasoning as expressed by Justice
O'Connor, who said that the state should have the discretion to
determine if a jury should hear victim impact evidence so it can
consider the true harm caused, as well as to enable it to associate
a unique identity to the victim.
12
barred from either offering 'a quick glimpse of the life' which a defendant 'chose to extin-
guish. . . '"Id. at 822 (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)).
116. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 825. "If, in a particular case, victim impact evidence so unduly prejudices the
jury that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment would provide a safeguard." Id. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168, 179-83 (1986).
119. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (citing Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted)). "[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evi-
dence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the
murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose
death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family." See also Victor D.
Vital, Payne v. Tennessee: The Use of Victim Impact Evidence at Capital Sentencing Trials,
19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 497 (1994).
120. Payne, 501 U.S. at 822. "But it was never held or even suggested in any of our
cases preceding Booth that the defendant, entitled as he was to individualized considera-
tion, was to receive that consideration wholly apart from the crime which he had commit-
ted." Id.
121. Id. at 827.
122. Id. at 832 (O'Connor, J., White, J., and Kennedy, J., concurring). "Murder is the
ultimate depersonalization... It transforms a living person with hopes, dreams, and fears
into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is special and unique about the person. The
Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to give some of that back." Id.
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The Payne Court's holding that the elimination of victim impact
evidence would result in a fundamental unfairness failed to real-
ize that the harm, which is claimed to be shown by such evidence,
can still be fully presented to the jury by other less prejudicial
means. Because the same judicial goals can be accomplished
through both the presentation of evidence of the crime and that
the victim had a family, there is not a fundamental unfairness by
prohibiting victim impact evidence. The fundamental unfairness
is created by permitting the Commonwealth to parade the griev-
ing family members into the courtroom to give tearful and de-
spair-ridden recitations, which serve no purpose other than to in-
fect the jury with anger and outrage. Furthermore, the Court's
claim that such evidence better enables jurors to assess culpability
and blameworthiness was without solid reasoning. Culpability
and blameworthiness lie in the crime itself, the associated plan-
ning and the actor's conduct. The effect on the family typically is
not a factor in the rationale for the crime. Instead, the tragic ef-
fect is simply a subsequent result that cannot be logically per-
ceived as establishing blameworthiness, which must be directly
linked to the act itself. If no family members exist to grieve for
the victim, it does not diminish the actor's culpability and blame-
worthiness. Conversely, it should not be allowed to contribute to
culpability and blameworthiness either.
Following the Payne decision, most of the states that utilized
capital punishment incorporated victim impact statements into
their statutory capital sentencing guidelines.'23 Twelve of these
states, including Pennsylvania, have revised their death penalty
statutes to provide a method of regulating the admission of victim
impact evidence at the penalty phase.124  One of the first and
most well known cases dealing with restrictions on victim impact
evidence in capital sentencing was the New Jersey case of State v.
Muhammad.'
In Muhammad, the defendant was charged with the kidnap-
ping, rape and murder of an eight-year-old girl and challenged the
constitutionality of the New Jersey statute.' The defendant ar-
123. Shanker, supra note 89, at 719. All states but Alaska, the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin allow the death penalty. Id. at 719 n.54.
124. Id. at 720.
125. 678 A.2d 164 (N.J. 1996).
126. Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 168. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(6), which provides:
844 Vol. 42
Victim Impact Evidence
gued that the statute violated the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment and the Due Process clause of the state constitution
because the admission of victim impact evidence was likely to con-
fuse and impassion the jury, which created an impermissible risk
that the penalty decision would be made in an arbitrary and ca-
pricious manner rather than on the basis of the relevant evi-
dence. 2 7  In capital sentencing, each juror must decide individu-
ally whether each mitigating factor presented exists and then the
jury must unanimously decide whether the aggravating factors
outweigh the mitigating factors(s).,'2 The subject New Jersey
statute provided for a "catch-all" circumstance, which was defined
as any other factor relevant to a defendant's character or record.'29
The associated instruction in the statute, which is given by the
judge before deliberation, provided that if a defendant presents
catch-all evidence, "the State may present evidence of the victim's
character, background and the impact on the victim's survivors."30
The jury is then instructed if at least one aggravating factor is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and evidence of a mitigating
circumstance is introduced as a catch-all factor, the jury may con-
sider the victim impact evidence in determining the appropriate
weight to attach to the mitigating catch-all evidence.'
The court held that, consistent with the Supreme Court's
holding in Payne, such a statute guiding the use of victim impact
evidence did not violate the Constitution.' 2 Further, such evi-
When a defendant at a sentencing proceeding presents evidence of the defendant's
character ... the State may present evidence of the murder victim's character and
background and of the impact of the murder on the victim's survivors. If the jury
finds that the State has proven at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable
doubt and the jury finds the existence of a mitigating factor ... the jury may consider
the victim and survivor evidence .. .in determining the appropriate weight to give
mitigating evidence presented....
Id. at 169.
127. Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 170-71. Under the statute, each individual juror must
decide whether each mitigating factor exists and then individually determine if the aggra-
vating outweigh the mitigating circumstances, beyond a reasonable doubt, and can only
impose death if the aggravating are found to outweigh the mitigating unanimously. Id.
128. Id. at 170. "The death penalty is imposed only if the jurors unanimously agree that
the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors." Id.
129. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(5)(h). This is a catch-all factor of mitigating evi-
dence that is not encompassed in the other defined factors under the statute.
130. Muhammad, 678 A.2d. at 170-71.
131. Id. at 171.
132. Id. at 171 (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 811). "On July 27, 1991, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which pro-
hibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments, does not bar the admission of




dence was held not to unconstitutionally burden one's right to in-
troduce catch-all mitigating evidence, despite the argument that
such statutory language has the effect of defendants foregoing the
right to present mitigation evidence to avoid the introduction of
victim impact evidence. 3 ' In harmonizing the constitutional
rights of the victim's family and of defendant's due process, the
court explained that both have a right to inform the jury of rele-
vant information and that it is unlikely that either injects fatal
emotionalism into the deliberations. The contention that the
defendant did not know, nor base, the crime on either the unique-
ness of the victim or the effect on the family was rejected on the
premise that it is obvious that taking another's life would termi-
nate the victim's uniqueness and have a negative effect on the
family.' Accordingly, the court held the jury should be permitted
to consider such foreseeable consequences. The court then held
that although it may have drafted the statute differently, the judi-
ciary did not have a license to rewrite what was enacted by the
legislature and that as written the statute was constitutional un-
der state and federal constitutions.37
The admission of victim impact evidence thus requires a balanc-
ing test, which weighs the probative value against the risk of cre-
ating undue prejudice or confusion of the jury.138 Ultimately, the
court asserted, whether the evidence is too inflammatory should
be decided on a case by case basis within the trial court's discre-
tion."' Evidence that shows the impact of the crime, or the
uniqueness of the victim, should be admissible unless it is unduly
inflammatory or serves no legitimate purpose in the adjudication
process. 4 ° The court admitted that instructions regarding the lim-
ited use of victim impact evidence would be complex, but they are
133. Muhammad, 678 A-2d at 172-73. "Defendants are constantly forced to make diffi-
cult choices when they are determining what mitigating evidence to present... The defen-
dant is no more restricted from introducing evidence relevant to the catch-all factor than he
would in introducing evidence relevant to any other mitigating factor." Id.
134. Id. at 175.
135. Id. at 173, 176.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 173 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464 (1991)). "While we
may have drafted the victim impact statute differently, the judiciary does not have a li-
cense 'to rewrite language enacted by the [Liegislature.'" Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 173.
138. Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 176 (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 836 (Souter, J., concur-
ring)). "[In each case there is a traditional guard against the inflammatory risk, in the trial
judge's authority and responsibility to control the proceedings consistently with due proc-
ess, on which grounds defendant's may object." Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 176.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 176-77.
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merely a further refinement that the system expects jurors to
make in capital cases.1 4' Although these limiting instructions can-
not eliminate the potential of misuse, the court said that the risk
does not justify a per se ban on all victim impact evidence.
14
1
Thus, the court held that it is clear from Payne and the statutory
language that the victim impact statute and its associated jury
instructions were constitutional.
43
The Muhammad court based its rejection of the argument that
the defendant did not know of the victim's uniqueness, and that he
had a family, on the premise that these were the obvious results
from the taking of the victim's life. Similarly, the impact should
be obvious to the jury as well and therefore it does not need to be
cumulatively presented through victim impact evidence. Since
there are not any proverbial givens in our legal system, this result
can be conveyed by other less inflammatory means.
Despite the court's blind assertion that jurors are expected to
understand complex instructions as part of making refinements in
capital cases, it is the court's duty to provide proper guidance.
Because words are not available that can truly stop a person from
feeling impassioned and outraged, adequate instructions are not
within the capability of our jurists. Accordingly, the only way to
prevent arbitrary decisions based on prejudicial victim impact evi-
dence is not to permit its more than questionable use. The court
also stated that it was not free to rewrite what the legislature en-
acted. While the Muhammad court's claim that it does not have
the ability to rewrite legislative enactments repugnant to the Con-
stitution may be accurate linguistically, in reality the court has
the power to nullify the viability of the statute if it finds the stat-
ute to be clearly, palpably, and plainly violative.
V. VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
The two most influential Pennsylvania cases on victim impact
evidence and associated jury instructions in capital sentencing are
Commonwealth v. Means'" and Commonwealth v. Natividad.1 45 In
Means, the defendant's motion to exclude victim impact evidence
141. Id. at 178-79. Part of this rationale is based on the presumption that there is no
reason to believe that jurors will act irresponsible in performing their duty even in the face
of inflammatory evidence. Id.
142. Id. at 179 (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
143. Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 182.
144. 773 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2001).
145. 773 A.2d 167 (Pa. 2001).
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as unconstitutional was sustained by the trial court because there
was insufficient guidance in the death penalty statute regarding
how to use the evidence in deliberations.146 In reviewing the trial
court's holding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first stated that
the constitutional provisions to be considered were the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, and Article
1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.'47 Since the constitutionality
of enacted legislation is presumed, 148 the court stated that it would
declare a statute repugnant only if it "clearly, palpably, and
plainly" was violative of the Constitution.'49 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court heard the issue of whether subsections (a)(2), deal-
ing with procedure in jury trials, and (c)(2), dealing with instruc-
tions to the jury, of Pennsylvania's statute were invalid as writ-
ten.5 ° The defendant asserted that victim impact evidence inter-
jected extremely emotional information into sentencing decisions,
and since the statute did not categorize such evidence as either an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, it exposed the jury to in-
flammatory information because its function was not clearly de-
146. Means, 773 A.2d at 146 (referencing Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
147. Means, 773 A.2d at 147. The Means court stated:
The federal constitutional provisions at issue are Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
of due process and equal protection. Theprovisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution
cited by the appellee are in Article 1; beginning with Section 1, guaranteeing equal
protection, Section 9, providing, in relevant part, for due process in criminal proceed-
ings; Section 13, prohibiting the infliction of cruel punishment; Section 26, precluding
governmental discrimination against any person; and Section 28, prohibiting dis-
crimination based on gender.
Id.
148. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Barud, 681 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1996)).
149. Means, 773 A.2d at 147 (citing Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 470 A.2d 1339 (Pa.
1983)).
150. Means, 773 A.2d at 147-48; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (a)(2) states:
In the sentencing hearing, evidence concerning the victim and the impact that the
death of the victim has had on the family or the victim is admissible. Additionally,
evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant and ad-
missible on the question of the sentence to be imposed. Evidence shall include mat-
ters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances specified in sub-
sections (d) and (e), and information concerning the victim and the impact that the
death of the victim has had on the family of the victim. Evidence of aggravating cir-
cumstances shall be limited to those circumstances specified in subsection (d).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (a)(2). 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (c)(2) states:
The court shall instruct the jury that if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance
and at least one mitigating circumstance, it shall consider, in weighing the aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances, any evidence presented about the victim and about
the impact of the murder on the victim's family. The court shall also instruct the jury
on any other matter that may be just and proper under the circumstances.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (c)(2).
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fined."' Such un-tethered use of victim impact evidence destroyed
the statute's alleged balancing structure, which constituted an
imposition of cruel and unusual punishment.' The Payne Court
had not found a due process or an equal protection issue in evalu-
ating the constitutional challenges, thus the claims against the
Constitution by Means were found to be without merit.
153
However, the court did evaluate whether victim impact evidence
causes the constitutional balance of the sentencing statute's
scheme to be disrupted.'54 In determining this, the court relied on
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal,'55 wherein the court held that evi-
dence need not be relevant strictly to the specific aggravating and
mitigating factors at issue to be presented to the jury. 56 Further-
more, the court noted that the legislature amended the statute,
apparently in support of the holding, to specifically include victim
impact evidence as admissible following the Abu-Jamal decision.'57
Finally, the court said that the latitude given to the states in
drafting their death penalty statutes allowed for the admission of
victim impact evidence.' Based on the language of the provision,
the court held there was no historical support for finding the capi-
tal sentencing statute invalid.59 Thus, the Pennsylvania statute
was held to be proper as drafted in light of the controlling prece-
dent.
1 60
151. Means, 773 A.2d at 148-49.
152. Id. at 149.
153. Id. at 150-51.
154. Id. at 152.
Appellee argues that only aggravating and mitigating circumstances are appropriate
considerations in the deliberative process. Victim impact testimony is not defined by
the legislature as an aggravating, nor is it tied to a mitigating circumstance as rele-
vant rebuttal to the character evidence offered by the defendant; therefore, it must be
precluded from consideration as it will cause the constitutional balance of the sen-
tencing scheme to be disrupted.
Id.
155. 555 A.2d 846 (Pa. 1989).
156. Means, 773 A.2d at 152 (citing Abu-Jamal, 555 A-2d at 846) (referencing 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9711 (a)(2)). The Abu-Jamal court stated: "[1]n the sentencing hearing, evi-
dence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant and admissible on
the question of the sentence to be imposed and shall include matters relating to any of the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances specified in subsections (d) and (e)." Means, 773
A.2d at 152.
157. Means, 773 A.2d at 152. Section 9711 (a)(2) was amended in 1995.
158. Id. at 153 (mentioning Commonwealth v. Fisher, 681 A.2d 130 (1996)).
159. Means, 773 A.2d at 153.
160. Id. "Pennsylvania jurisprudence favors the introduction of all relevant evidence
during a capital sentencing proceeding. Pennsylvania's sentencing scheme does not limit
the evidence admissible in the penalty phase to only the information necessary to establish
aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Id.
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The next major issue addressed in Means was whether the evi-
dence was improper because the jury instructions did not suffi-
ciently inform jurors of how to weigh the evidence, which arguably
caused the sentence to be arbitrary and capricious."' The court
stated that the absence of directions on what weight was to be
given to victim impact evidence did not affect the constitutionality
of such evidence because there is no constitutional requirement
that a jury be advised in this manner.6 2 The court was satisfied
with the fact that the judges have the knowledge and means to
prevent prejudicial information from entering into the jury's de-
liberations under the guise of victim impact evidence, and there-
fore no bar against the admission of such evidence existed."'
The court cited decisions such as Muhammad, to show that
most jurisdictions that allowed victim impact evidence to be con-
sidered did so on the basis that such evidence is admissible as a
foreseeable consequence of the crime and relevant as a factor in
establishing the moral culpability of the defendant.' Such deci-
sions were found to be persuasive support for the Commonwealth
in rejecting the constitutional challenges by Means.66
No support was found for the trial court's conclusion that the
statute in question violated Article 1, Section 13 of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution.'67 Common practice within the Common-
wealth was influential in determining the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's capital sentencing statute."6 As such, judicial no-
tice of the practice of using pre-sentence reports containing victim
impact evidence being a well established practice in the Common-
wealth was taken, along with the fact that said use did not provide
a basis for excluding cases involving fatality.69 The court believed
that this supported the admission of such evidence in capital sen-
tencing when monitored by judicial discretion.' Furthermore,
legislative intent evident in the Crime Victim's Act "' gave victims
161. Id. at 153.
162. Id. at 154.
164. Id.
165. Means, 773 A.2d at 155-56.
166. Id. at 156.
167. Id. at 157.
168. Id. at 156-57. "Policy is distilled through, among other things, observation of com-
mon practices, customs and legislation reflecting the will of the people." Id.
169. Id. at 157.
170. Means, 773 A.2d at 157.
171. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11.101 et seq. (2003).
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a basic bill of rights that favored the inclusion of victim impact
evidence. 7 '
Although the court found the statute valid, it recognized the
procedural concerns regarding the application of jury instructions
for victim impact evidence.'73 Despite the longstanding tradition
of vesting great discretion in the trial judge's ability to phrase in-
structions, because of the complexity of such evidence in capital
sentencing, the court drafted model instructions to be used at the
114judge's discretion in future cases.
Justice Zappala dissented from the majority in Means, believing
victim impact evidence unconstitutionally channeled the jury's
deliberations toward examining the victim's life instead of the
crime because the testimony explains in great detail the enduring
pain suffered by the victim's family.7 ' Justice Zappala stated that
the introduction of victim evidence is incompatible with precedent
established by Commonwealth v. Fisher,7 ' which provided such
evidence interjects arbitrariness into sentencing when unaccom-
panied by restrictions as to its presentation or evaluation.'77 Fur-
ther, Zappala argued that while stringent guidelines may mini-
172. Means, 773 A.2d at 157.
173. Id. at 157. In particular, the court noted § 9711 subsections (a)(2) and (c)(2) as
relevant in this respect.
174. Id. at 158-59. The court noted that:
The prosecution has introduced what is known as victim impact evidence. Victim
impact evidence is not evidence of a statutory aggravating circumstance and it cannot
be a reason by itself to impose the death penalty. The introduction of victim impact
evidence does not in any way relieve the Commonwealth of its burden to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance. You may consider
this victim impact evidence in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty
only if you first find that the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt independent from the victim impact evidence,
and if one or more jurors has found that one or more mitigating circumstances have
been established by a preponderance of the evidence. Victim impact evidence is sim-
ply another method of informing you about the nature and circumstances of the crime
in question. You may consider this evidence in determining an appropriate punish-
ment. However, the law does not deem the life of one victim more valuable than an-
other; rather, victim impact evidence shows that the victim, like the defendant, is a
unique individual. Your consideration must be limited to a rational inquiry into the
culpability of the defendant, not an emotional response to the evidence. The sentence
you impose must be in accordance with the law as I instruct you and not based on
sympathy, prejudice, emotion or public opinion and not based solely on victim impact.
Id.
175. Id. at 160-61 (Zappala, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
176. 681 A.2d 130 (Pa. 1996).
177. Means, 773 A.2d at 161 (Zappala, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (citing
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 681 A.2d 130 (Pa. 1996)).
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mize the constitutional threat, it is not the role of the court to
amend what the General Assembly has enacted.'
Justice Zappala believed that the statute, in subsections (a)(2)
and (c)(2), was fundamentally unfair, and thus violated due proc-
ess.'79 Zappala also thought that victim impact evidence should
not be introduced to rebut defense evidence introduced under the
catch all factor.' The rationale for the foregoing was that in or-
der to prevent victim impact evidence from being admitted, a de-
fendant would be forced to forgo entering mitigation evidence.'
8 '
The statute was inadequate to regulate the presentation and con-
sideration of victim impact evidence under subsections (a)(2) and
(c)(2), thus Zappala thought it was unconstitutional. 82
Although Justice Nigro agreed with Justice Zappala that the
statute was unconstitutional as written, he dissented in regard to
the circumstances and procedures under which juries are permit-
ted to consider victim impact evidence, because he believed the
sentencing scheme to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.' He
stated that in Payne, the Eighth Amendment was held not to pro-
vide a per se bar to the admission of victim impact evidence, but
also recognized that such might be so unduly inflammatory as to
violate the Due Process Clause by rendering the trial fundamen-
tally unfair.' The statute allowed victim impact evidence to be
presented for any purpose deemed relevant. 8 5 The statute in-
structed the jury, without any guidance, that it "shall consider"
victim impact evidence if it finds at least one aggravating and
mitigating circumstance. 186 Justice Nigro said that he, in contra-
diction to the majority, believed such an unguided admission of
victim impact evidence to be used by the jury in its deliberations
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
87
However, Justice Nigro asserted that he believed victim impact
evidence should be admissible when used to rebut evidence pre-
178. Means, 773 A.2d at 161 (Zappala, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
179. Id. (Zappala, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
180. Id. (Zappala, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). The catch-all factor in
Pennsylvania's statute is found in § 9711 (e)(8). Id.
181. Id. (Zappala, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
182. Id. at 162 (Zappala, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
183. Means, 773 A.2d at 162 (Nigro, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
184. Id. (Nigro, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 825).
185. Means, 773 A.2d at 162 (Nigro, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (citing 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (a)(2), (cX2)).
186. Means, 773 A.2d at 162 (Nigro, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
187. Id. (Nigro, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
Vol. 42852
Victim Impact Evidence
sented as a catch-all mitigating circumstance as put forth by pre-
ceding Commonwealth decisions.'
Pennsylvania's view of victim impact evidence was further ex-
plored in Commonwealth v. Natividad.189 In Natividad, the defen-
dant was sentenced to death for murdering the victim during the
commission of a robbery.19 ° The imposition of the death sentence
occurred after two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating
circumstance were found, with the jury determining that the ag-
gravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circum-
stance.9 ' The Supreme Court addressed the issue of victim impact
evidence after first finding that the evidence was sufficient to es-
tablish the conviction, as required on automatic appellate re-
view, ' and finding no merit in the claims of error.
The court then dealt with the claim that the Pennsylvania capi-
tal sentencing statute was unconstitutional.' The court referred
to its decision in Means, where no violation of the federal or Penn-
sylvania constitutions were found,'95 and consequently the consti-
tutional challenges by the appellant were denied.'9 The court
then addressed the specific claims of error regarding the admis-
sion of victim impact evidence at sentencing."'
The issue involved whether notice of an intent to present victim
impact evidence prior to trial should be required.'98 The court held
that to require such notice prior to trial is good practice because it
enables the defendant to prepare his or her defense. 9 9 The court
then held that the notice provided by the Commonwealth twenty-
four hours prior, along with the fact that the defendant made no
188. Id. at 162-63 (Nigro, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (citing Fisher, 681
A.2d at 146 (holding that the admission of evidence at the penalty phase should be limited
to that which is specifically relevant to an enumerated aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance)).
189. 773 A.2d 167 (Pa. 2001).
190. Natividad, 773 A.2d at 170-71.
191. Id. at 171.
192. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d 937, 942 (Pa. 1982)).
193. Id. at 176.
194. Id. at 176-77.
195. Natividad, 773 A.2d at 177 (citing Means, 773 A.2d 143).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. Appellant complained that without sufficient notice he was deprived of an op-
portunity to investigate the underlying basis of the testimony and the credibility of the
victim impact witness. Appellant urged such adoption, which is similar to that required
regarding notice of aggravating circumstances pursuant to PA R. CRIM. P. 352. Id. See
Commonwealth v. Wesley, 753 A.2d 204 (Pa. 2000).
199. Natividad, 773 A.2d at 178.
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objection at that time, was sufficient notice, thus no undue burden
was placed on the defendant."°0
The final claim addressed in Natividad was that insufficient in-
structions were given to the jury on how to properly consider vic-
tim impact evidence in their deliberation process.20 ' The court
first stated that a judge is free to utilize discretion in wording in-
structions to a jury.20 2 Next, the court held that the absence of
specific instruction as to what weight should be given to victim
impact evidence did not affect the defendant's constitutional
rights.2 3 Furthermore, the court held that there was not a consti-
tutional issue with the instruction because it found that the in-
structions given to the jury were consistent with the model in-
structions drafted by the Means court, which provided sufficient
guidance for the jury to properly consider victim impact evi-
dence.20 4
The court, in both Means and Natividad, passed judgment on
the issue of whether victim impact evidence violated Due Process,
the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, and equal pro-
tection because of the holding in Payne. While the court was ad-
mittedly bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, the fact remains
that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment evolves as
societal norms change. Payne was decided a decade before either
Means or Natividad and as such by itself cannot be said to accu-
rately represent what our society accepts as cruel and unusual
punishment. Even the Supreme Court itself changed from one
end of the spectrum to the other from the decision in Booth to that
of Payne, which spanned a period of only four (4) years. As such,
the subject of victim impact evidence needs to be revisited because
times and opinions change. Furthermore, the rationale for the
Payne decision is not nearly as strong as the argument against
victim impact evidence in light of its highly prejudicial nature and
the fact that a person's life is at issue.
Despite the court's holdings, victim impact evidence causes a
disruption of the constitutional balance of the statutory scheme.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 180.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Natividad, 773 A.2d at 182-83 (Zappala, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part
and Nigro, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (in each of their separate dissents each
said they would remand for a new sentencing hearing, reiterating their beliefs as stated in
their dissents in the Means case).
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While it may be true that there is not a constitutional requirement
that the jury be instructed on what weight to give victim impact
evidence, the threat of arbitrary decisions created by the inflam-
matory nature of such evidence without adequate judicial limita-
tions, which limitations are not feasible, does create a constitu-
tional violation because cruel and unusual punishment ensues.
Because the statute inadequately regulates the presentation and
consideration of victim impact evidence, and because such evi-
dence is so unduly inflammatory, the use of victim impact evi-
dence under the statute violates the Due Process Clause because
the proceeding is rendered fundamentally unfair.
Most recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revisited the
issue of using victim impact evidence under the capital sentencing
statute in Commonwealth v. Rice."5 At a non-jury trial, the defen-
dant Timothy Rice was found guilty of two counts of first-degree
murder.0 6 During the sentencing phase, the jury returned a sen-
205. 795 A.2d 340 (Pa. 2002).
206. Rice, 795 A.2d 340. Rice was also found guilty of two counts of aggravated assault,
one count of recklessly endangering another person, one count of possessing an instrument
of crime, and two violations of the Uniform Firearms Act. Id. at 345. See also 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2502(a) (2001) (stating that "[a] criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first
degree when it is committed by an intentional killing."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(d) (stat-
ing that "i]ntentional killing' [means] killing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by
any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702
(a)(1)(4) (2001) (stating that "[a] person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: (1) attempts to
cause serious bodily injury to another, causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or reck-
lessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; (4)
attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a
deadly weapon."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2705 (2001) (stating that "[a] person commits a
misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may
place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
907(B) (2001) (stating that "[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he
possesses a firearm or other weapon concealed upon his person with intent to employ it
criminally."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 907 (D) (defining an instrument of crime '[a]s any of the
following: (1) anything specially made or specially adapted for criminal use, (2) Anything
specially used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not
manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6106 (2001)
(stating that "Except as provided in (2), any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or
any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of
abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license under this
chapter commits a felony of the third degree. (2) A person who is otherwise eligible to pos-
sess a valid license under this chapter but carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person
who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed
place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license and has not committed any
other criminal violation commits a misdemeanor of the first degree."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 6108 (2001) (stating that "[n]o person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time
upon the public streets or upon any public property in a city of the first class unless: (1)
such person is licensed to carry a firearm; or (2) such person is exempt from licensing under
section 6106 of this title (relating to firearms not to be carried without a license).").
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tence of death for each of the murder convictions after finding that
the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circum-
stances."7 Accordingly, the trial court imposed a sentence of death
for each first-degree murder conviction."8 Rice sought direct re-
view by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, bypassing the Appeals
Court of Philadelphia County.2 9
Rice raised two issues on capital appeal with regard to victim
impact evidence, which he asserted warranted a new sentencing
hearing.20 These issues were whether the language of the statute
was unconstitutional, and whether the court erred in giving its
jury instructions on how to consider the evidence. 21' The court
first addressed the constitutional challenge to the statute itself.
212
Rice's precise contention was that the subsections were unconsti-
tutional because they did not provide any guidance as to how a
jury was to incorporate the evidence into its deliberation."3 The
court held that because these exact constitutional concerns were
addressed in previous cases, and found constitutionally valid, the
claim had no merit.2 4
Rice's claim of judicial error in using the law of New Jersey to
instruct the jury was addressed next.2"' The general rule was that
a court is well within its discretion to use whatever wording it sees
fit in phrasing instructions, provided the words sufficiently convey
the law to the jury.218 The court stated that appellate review must
207. Rice, 795 A.2d at 345. The jury found, for each murder conviction, two aggravating
circumstances as follows: (1) Rice caused a grave risk of death to another person, in addi-
tion to the victim of the offense, in the commission of an offense. Id. See 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9711 (D)(7); and (2) that he had been convicted of another murder at the time of the
murders at issue. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (D)(11). The two mitigating circum-
stances that were found for each murder conviction were: (1) the capacity of Rice to appre-
ciate the criminality of his conduct had been substantially impaired (See 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9711 (E)(3)) and (2) that he allowed himself to be turned over to the police following
the murders (See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (E)(8)). Rice, 795 A.2d at 345.
208. Rice, 795 A.2d at 345. An aggregate consecutive term of twenty to forty years im-
prisonment was imposed on the remaining charges. See id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 350 n.11. Rice asked if the court erred in admitting victim impact evidence.
However, he did not mention or develop this issue in his brief and therefore waived his
claim. Id. See Commonwealth v. LaCava, 666 A.2d 221, 229 n.9 (Pa. 1995). Although the
court in LaCava held that none of the claims warranted relief, only the discussion on victim
impact evidence under the statute is of concern within the context of this comment.
211. Rice, 795 A.2d at 350-51. See also the text of 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(a)(2), supra
note 9 and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (c)(2), supra note 151.
212. Rice, 795 A-2d at 351 (relying on its decisions in Means and Natividad).
213. Rice, 795 A.2d at 351.
214. Id.
215. Id. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(6).
216. Rice, 795 A-2d at 351-52.
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examine the instruction in its totality in determining if the charge
was erroneous, while noting that the relevant law was stated
217without any ambiguity.
The court then stated the fact that the prosecution, Rice's coun-
sel, and the trial court all discussed how to instruct the jury about
victim impact evidence prior to the charge actually being made to
the jury."1 8 The majority also noted that the Rice court, without
the benefit of Means and Natividad as procedural precedent, ex-
pressed concern as to how to properly channel juror discretion in
considering victim impact evidence before giving the instruc-
tions. 2" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the trial
court incorrectly stated the law because it stated that victim im-
pact evidence could be considered only after any aggravating cir-
cumstance and the catch-all mitigating circumstance were found,
similar to the New Jersey Statute.22 ° The rationale for this was
that Pennsylvania law permits victim impact evidence after any
aggravating and any mitigating, not just the catch-all mitigating
as with the New Jersey statute, are found. 22' Furthermore, the
jury was instructed to consider the evidence only to determine the
weight to attach to the catch-all circumstance instead of in weigh-
ing the aggravating circumstances against any mitigating circum-
stances presented.222
Despite this error, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined
that a new sentencing hearing was not warranted because the er-
217. Id. at 351-52 (citing Commonwealth v. Ohle, 470 A.2d 61, 70 (Pa. 1983)).
A trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions to a jury, and may
chose its own wording so long as it clearly, adequately, and accurately presents the
law to the jury for its consideration. Appellate review of a charge must be based on
an examination of the instruction as a whole to determine if it was fair or prejudicial.
Rice, 795 A-2d at 351-52. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(2).
218. Rice, 795 A.2d at 353.
219. Id.
If you unanimously find that the Commonwealth has proven at least one aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt and any of you find at least one mitigating factor
which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to circumstances of the of-
fense, and that's what I alluded to earlier as the catch-all, then you may consider any
presented victim impact testimony in determining the appropriate weight to be given
to the mitigating catch-all factor. Keep in mind victim impact testimony cannot be
used as a general or specific aggravating factor or as a means of weighing the worth
of this defendant against the worth of either or both victims in this case. Instead, it's





222. Id. at 353.
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ror was not prejudicial.223 The error was held not to be prejudicial
because the jury would have been allowed to consider the evidence
even if it had received an instruction like that in Means, because
the instruction actually given was more restrictive than the one
given in Means.224 The jury was also correctly instructed that vic-
tim impact evidence is neither an aggravating nor mitigating cir-
cumstance in itself and is not to be used to weigh the worth of
Rice's life against that of the victims.225 Consequently, the major-
ity held that none of the claims of error raised by Rice warranted
relief. 226 Upon a thorough review of the record, the court deter-
mined that the sentence of death was not the product of passion or
prejudice, and therefore affirmed the sentence of death imposed
upon Rice.227
Justice Nigro concurred with the majority opinion, but wrote
separately to address the jury instruction regarding victim impact
evidence, stressing the rationale he proffered in his dissent in
Means.22 However, realizing that the majority of courts have con-
cluded that the statute was constitutionally valid, Justice Nigro
stated that he was compelled to concur that the challenge must
fail.
229
Chief Justice Zappala, however, authored a dissenting opinion
in which he said that he would remand the case for a new sentenc-
ing hearing.3 ' Justice Zappala stated that he would remand the
case because he believed that victim impact evidence unconstitu-
tionally directs the jury's deliberations to examine the victim's life
instead of the criminal act because it explains in great detail the
enduring pain suffered by the victim's family.23 1 Although the
court expressed its great concern for the horrific consequences
223. Rice, 795 A.2d at 354.
224. Id. Referring to the fact the instruction stated in Means, that victim impact evi-
dence is only to be considered after at least one aggravating and one mitigating circum-
stance is found, as compared to one aggravating and the catch-all mitigating factor relevant
to the defendant's character would have been met since the jury found two aggravating and
two mitigating circumstances. Id. The gist of the court's interpretation was that since
victim impact evidence was proper even with the more restrictive instruction that was
actually given, it was harmless because such evidence would have been proper had the
correct instruction adhered to the less restrictive Pennsylvania law. Id
225. Id. at 354. The Rice court stated that this is consistent with the established case
law in Pennsylvania.
226. Id. at 359
227. Id. at 359.
228. Rice, 795 A.2d at 363 (Nigro, J., concurring). See also Means, 773 A.2d at 162-67.
229. Rice, 795 A-2d at 364 (Nigro, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 359 (Zappala, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
231. Id. (Zappala, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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arising from such crimes as murder, Justice Zappala said that the
court was obligated to follow the law in the narrowly crafted sen-
tencing scheme to avoid the capricious and arbitrary imposition of
death.3 ' He further stated that capital sentencing was not de-
signed as a mechanism for an outpouring of grief, no matter how
presented, because victim impact evidence by its very nature is
extremely prejudicial.233 The ability of such evidence to persuade a
fair-minded juror to impose the death penalty in itself mandates
that there must be safeguards in place sufficient to prevent the
jury from disrupting the constitutionally required weighing proc-
ess.234 Therefore, he could not agree with the majority's opinion
that the jury, though not properly instructed, was capable of de-
termining how to use such evidence when the court system's ju-
235rists have trouble interpreting the same.
Also joining the majority in affirming the guilt phase verdict
was Justice Cappy, who dissented in the affirming of the sentence
phase. He found the jury instruction to be erroneous because the
jury was instructed that victim impact evidence was connected to
its consideration of the evidence presented under the "catch-all
factor" mitigating circumstance.236 Justice Cappy noted that the
language of the instruction was similar to that examined by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Muhammad.237
He then asserted that the Pennsylvania statute is distinctly dif-
ferent from that of New Jersey because it does not intend the evi-
dence to be considered as a direct link or counterweight to mitiga-
tion evidence, but instead the legislative intent provides for it as a
part of the general deliberation process.3 '
Justice Cappy could not agree with the majority's mere ac-
knowledgment that the charge, which reflected the New Jersey
232. Id. at 360 (Zappala, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
233. Id. (Zappala, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
234. Rice, 795 A.2d at 360 (Zappala, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
235. Id. (Zappala, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). On this basis he would
remand for a new hearing. Id.
236. Id. (Cappy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
9711 (e)(8), which codified the "catch-all factor" through the introduction of "any other
evidence of mitigation." Rice, 795 A.2d at 360 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(8)).
237. Rice, 795 A.2d at 361 (Cappy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See State
v. Muhammad, 678 A-2d 164 (N.J. 1996). In Muhammad, the court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the provision and approved the use of the jury instructions that only provided
for consideration of victim impact evidence as linked to testimony relevant to the defen-
dant's character. This holding was in line with the nature of the statutory scheme of the
New Jersey legislature. Rice, 795 A.2d at 361.
238. Rice, 795 A.2d at 361-62 (Cappy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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approach, resulted in no prejudice since the instruction was more
restrictive because he believed the statutes offered two distinct
solutions to how victim impact evidence should be utilized.2 9 The
two statutes reflect conscious and differing choices of how such
evidence should be used, not that they are merely different de-
grees of restricting the same use. 240  Therefore, Justice Cappy be-
lieved that following the New Jersey approach caused prejudice to
a defendant and, consequently, he disagreed with the majority
opinion that the error was harmless. Justice Cappy's rationale for
this belief was that the charge did not reflect the proper delibera-
tive use intended by the statute's enactment and that to uphold
the instruction would contradict the intent of the legislature.24'
To quote Justice Zappala in his dissent, "victim impact evidence
unconstitutionally channels the jury's deliberations toward exam-
ining the victim's life instead of the criminal act." Such testimony
unnecessarily explains in great detail the overwhelming and con-
tinual pain suffered by victim's survivors. As such, victim impact
evidence is extremely prejudicial by its very nature and has the
substantial inherent risk of persuading even a fair-minded juror to
return a sentence of death solely by itself. Although there are
safeguards in place within the statute, appellate procedure, and
our Constitution, none of them can negate the devastating nature
of the prejudice of such evidence. Victim impact evidence is a can-
cer that eats away at any rationale person's reasoning and causes
the person to act upon the improper passion. As a direct result,
decisions are unavoidably rendered on an arbitrary and capricious
basis.
239. Id. at 362-63 (Cappy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Under the New Jersey approach, victim impact testimony can only be introduced in a
case where the defendant has chosen to present evidence of his or her own character
as a factor mitigating against the imposition of death. Thus, in the New Jersey sys-
tem, a defendant can preclude introduction of victim impact testimony by choosing to
forgo presentation of character testimony in mitigation. In distinct contrast, in
Pennsylvania victim impact evidence is not viewed as a counterweight to evidence of
the defendant's character. Instead, victim impact evidence is introduced as part of
the texture of the case: it provides the jury with an identity for the victim and helps
to foster a complete understanding of the foreseeable consequences of the defendant's
actions. Thus, in Pennsylvania, a defendant need never weigh the Hobson's choice of
forgoing relevant mitigation evidence in an effort to prohibit introduction of victim
impact testimony
Id.
240. Id. at 363 (Cappy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
241. Id. at 363 (Cappy, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part). For the aforemen-
tioned reasons, Justice Cappy would have remanded for a new sentencing hearing with




The death penalty has a long history, which extends back to an-
cient times. As societal norms evolved, methods of both imposition
and execution of capital punishment also changed. While the sur-
rounding laws that provide for the imposition of the death sen-
tence have changed, the gravity of the sentence has not. However,
just as these beliefs have caused the laws and methods of capital
punishment to become unacceptable and mandated their change,
the concept of what justifies fundamental fairness in the proce-
dural arena should change with these modifications. In this age of
technology, such advances as DNA testing and forensic sciences
have reduced the degree of doubt surrounding many capital cases
exponentially. Consequently, the Commonwealth's burden of
proving guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" has become an increas-
ingly easier burden to meet. Such changes provide greater justice,
which is what our legal system is premised upon. However, this
justice also requires procedural protection for the accused as well
as the convicted. Without such a basis, our society would revert
back to barbarism.
Our legal system not only strives to provide justice for those
who suffer the consequences resulting from crime, but also to pro-
tect those accused of committing crimes from an over usurpation
of governmental power. Indeed, our country and legal system were
born from the need of our forefathers to escape the brutal tyranny
of colonial British rule. The history books are fraught with ac-
counts of unjust and excessive punishments resulting from the
application of governmental police powers. Victim impact evi-
dence falls into this category.
When dealing with capital sentencing, the threat to society from
that particular criminal has already been eliminated. This indi-
vidual, at a minimum, will never see the "outside" world again.
Before the most severe of all punishments is imposed, it is impera-
tive that the facts of the crime merit such an extreme punishment.
This is not to say that the death penalty does not have its place,
for inevitably there are those who will undoubtedly commit acts
that are so horrific that their right to life itself should be deemed
forfeited. However, this ultimate retribution should be imposed
based on the crime itself, the surrounding circumstances, and the




The logical reasoning in the dissenting opinions of such cases as
Furman,242 Means,243 and Natividad,2  and the premises of the ma-
jority's holding in such cases as Booth,245 which assert that victim
impact testimony violates Due Process and Equal Protection, prof-
fer much well reasoned wisdom. Such evidence clearly is violative
of the Federal and Commonwealth Constitutions because victim
impact evidence elicits arbitrary sentencing, which constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment, as well as creating a functional
prohibition of a defendant being able to fully argue on his or her
own behalf, thereby denying the defendant Due Process. The arbi-
trary sentencing is a direct byproduct of the impossibility to draft
sentencing instructions that can truly eliminate the inflammatory
effect created by hearing the outpouring of grief from the members
of the victim's family. Regardless of the role of the jury in our sys-
tem, and the fiction we hold that the jury is capable of discerning
how to properly use victim impact evidence, such an evidentiary
admission can serve no valid purpose other than to inflame their
hearts and passions. While it is true that the requirement of lim-
iting instructions established in Furman, and put forth as a proto-
type in Means, clearly inform jurors to what extent victim impact
evidence is permissible in their deliberations, there are no possible
instructions that can tell human beings not to feel impassioned.
As such, jurors in the capital sentencing phase who have heard
victim impact evidence are led to act upon their feelings, thereby
resulting in an arbitrary and capricious sentence. It is human
nature to be controlled to some degree by one's feelings. This is
not to say that people cannot separate emotion from judgment.
However, a person's beliefs will inevitably be affected on some un-
conscious level by the combination of personal values and emo-
tions. When this occurs, there is no instruction that can be
drafted that can prevent its effect, and the threat of arbitrary
results cannot be eliminated.
Victim impact evidence is unnecessary because the sentencing
decision should be based on the objective facts. By the penalty
phase, guilt has been established on the facts presented. If they,
along with the crime itself, are insufficient for a jury to render a
sentence of death, then such a sentence is unwarranted and con-
242. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239.
243. Means, 773 A.2d at 143.
244. Natividad, 773 A.2d at 167.
245. Booth, 482 U.S. at 496.
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stitutes a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. When
someone has been killed in a manner so malicious as to establish a
conviction for first-degree murder, a defendant's presentation of
mitigating evidence is not going to nullify the facts of the crime.
On the other hand, the proverbial "sob story" told by the aggrieved
and tear-ridden child or widow will undoubtedly inflame the pas-
sions of most jurors that must endure the horrific explanation of
the effect of the crime. If it does, then the facts of the crime are
not strong enough to warrant an imposition of death and to ac-
complish such through the use of victim impact evidence would be
fundamentally unfair. Victim impact evidence is designed to stir
emotions and make those involved want swift and appropriate
justice, plain and simple. This is clearly violative of the rights and
protections of the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions, not to
mention the Rules of Evidence.
Just as many courts have stated that victim impact evidence
should be allowed as a foreseeable consequence of the crime of
murder, this foreseeable consequence eliminates the reason for the
very existence of such evidence in the jury's deliberation. Victim
testimony cannot establish anything that the crime itself and
common sense cannot establish, except an impermissible passion.
As horrible as it may sound, live accounts of how lives have been
torn apart are not, and should not, be pertinent to a jury's delib-
eration process. If a father and husband is brutally murdered, it
is obvious that the crime will cause his family great emotional
pain, make a widow out of a loving wife, leave infant children fa-
therless, and potentially cause financial ruin to all who relied on
the victim. A competent juror does not need victim impact evi-
dence to be informed of these painful realities.
A defendant's most fundamental right to life should be vigor-
ously guarded. However, this right is violated when factors other
than conduct and the crime result in a sentence of death. To sub-
mit victim impact evidence to a jury is merely a method of emo-
tional coercion that has no legitimate purpose in our legal system,
which constitutes a constitutional violation of a defendant's Four-
teenth Amendment right to Due Process and Eighth Amendment
right to Equal Protection.
Jason Elliot Nard
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